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ited preferences of smallholder farmers for PES contracts. Our results suggest that potential PES recipients in
Zambia value in-kind agricultural inputs more highly than cash payments (even when the monetary value of
the inputs is lower than the cash payment), highlighting that PES could potentially succeed in conserving forests
and intensifying smallholder agriculture. Respondents who intended to clear forest within the next three years
were found to require higher payments, but could be motivated to enrol in appropriately designed PES.
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Zambia1. Introduction
Deforestation and forest degradation is recognized as major source
of global CO2 emissions, especially in developing countries (Van der
Werf et al., 2009). Hosonuma et al. (2012) estimate that four-ﬁfths of
forest loss between 2000 and 2010 was associated with agricultural ex-
pansion, largely driven by small-scale agriculture in developing coun-
tries. Meanwhile, increasing agricultural smallholder productivity is
formanyAfrican governments a critical pathway to achieve the Sustain-
able Development Goals of ending poverty, achieving food security, and
improving nutrition. To achieve this, many African governments
reintroduced input subsidy programmes (Jayne and Rashid, 2013).
It remains however contested whether agricultural intensiﬁcation
decreases deforestation. Benhin (2006) highlights that in the absence
of improved technologies many small-scale farmers rely on newly-
cleared and fertile forest land as a cheap production input. Hence, in-
creasing agricultural yields on existing farmland could reduce the pres-
sure to clear new areas. At the same time agricultural intensiﬁcation
commonly increases the relative returns from agriculture vis-a-vis
forestry, creating stronger incentives to expand agricultural areasGermany.
laufer).(Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001). Especially in frontier regions, promot-
ing agricultural productivity may in fact increase pressure on forests
(Angelsen, 2010). Ewers et al. (2009) conclude that increased yields of
staple crops saved forest land in developing countries between 1979
and 1999. But a potential reduction in cultivated areas was
counterbalanced by increasing cultivation of non-staple crops. In a glob-
al, cross-country analysis of historic data, Rudel et al. (2009) ﬁnd no
general evidence for agricultural intensiﬁcation reducing cultivated
areas. Consequently, a fundamental question is how to increase produc-
tivity of smallholder agriculture without further aggravating pressure
on forests.
Payments for Ecosystem Services1 (PES) are an increasingly
discussed and implemented policy instrument to reduce deforestation
(e.g. Muradian, 2013). PES play a central role in REDD+as part of global
climate change mitigation strategies (Angelsen, 2009). In the context of
deforestation, PES are predominantly conceptualized as incentives that
compensate land owners for the opportunity costs of alternative land
uses.1 Following Wunder (2015, p. 241) we understand PES as “voluntary transactions be-
tween service users and service providers that are conditional on agreed rules of natural
resource management for generating offsite services”.
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clearing by smallholder farmers by offering conditional assistance in ag-
ricultural intensiﬁcation.2 The underlying idea is that participating
farmers receive agricultural inputs conditional on land use practices
whichmaintain the capacity of ecosystems to provide essential services.
The novelty of the proposed combination of agricultural support and
PES is that farmers potentially attain beneﬁts from increased productiv-
ity that are larger than the direct beneﬁts received in the scheme,
allowing to reduce transfer amounts compared to conventional PES.
To our knowledge no literature explicitly focused on the potential link
between agricultural support programmes and PES (cf Karsenty,
2011). Designing PES as supportive incentives through providing agri-
cultural support may also outperform conventional PES in terms of
complementing existing motivations for conservation behaviour. Ex-
perimental studies have shown that the supportive framing of incen-
tives crowd-in intrinsic motivations for environmental-friendly
behaviour (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Vollan, 2008; Cranford and Mourato,
2014). In contrast, PES framed as pure market transactions may reduce
such intrinsic motivations (Muradian, 2013; Rode et al., 2015).
To the best of our knowledge, incentivizing PES with support for ag-
ricultural intensiﬁcation is a yet rarely implemented approach. There is
evidence that beneﬁciaries can prefer in-kind payments over cash pay-
ments (Engel, 2016). One explanation is that in-kind payments can as-
sure productive investments instead of immediate consumption
(Asquith et al., 2008; Zabel and Engel, 2010). PES recipients in Bolivia
opted for payments in beehives and apiculture training instead of cash
(Asquith et al., 2008). In-kind paymentsmay be furthermore a viable al-
ternative to cash payments in locations where access to certain goods is
constrained. Zabel and Engel (2010) conducted a choice experiment
among potential recipients for a carnivore protection scheme in India.
They ﬁnd that the delivery of in-kind payments is preferred by respon-
dents living further away frommarketswhere access to products is con-
nected to high transaction costs.
There is also evidence that in-kind payments can support the adop-
tion of environmentally friendly practices. Wunder and Albán (2008)
report from two PES in Ecuador that provide training in forestry in addi-
tion to cash payments. Grillos (2017) presents PES, which provide in-
kind payments with various goods that can be used for environmental
conservation. Cranford and Mourato (2014) evaluated the prospective
beneﬁts of a credit-based PES scheme through a choice experiment in
Ecuador. Under the proposed instruments borrowerswould be required
to adopt environmentally friendly agricultural practices such as agro-
forestry and would in return beneﬁt from reduced interest rates.
Kaczan et al. (2013) elicit preferences for different payment mecha-
nisms among potential PES participants in Tanzania. They include an
up-front fertilizer payment in addition to annual cash payments in
their choice experiment. Upfront fertilizer would signiﬁcantly increase
the proﬁtability of environmental-friendly agroforestry. They ﬁnd that
respondents would accept PES contracts of 10 years only by receiving
this up-front payment.
Research on in-kind-based PES3 highlights however some chal-
lenges related to alternative payment vehicles (cf Engel, 2016): a) In-
kind payments are ideally divisible into small units to allow ﬂexible
compensation. In the case of training activities this seems hardly possi-
ble. b) In-kind payments are ideally required on a regular basis. For in-
stance in the case of Asquith et al. (2008), demand for beehives and
apiculture training is decreasing after some years, requiring to adopt
new payment vehicles. c) In-kind payments are often required or2 Participating farmerswould receive agricultural inputs, conditional that they have not
cleared any additional forests for agriculture. This conditionality contrasts such instrument
from conventional input subsidy programmes and complies with the PES deﬁnition pro-
vided by Wunder (2015, p. 241).
3 Two studies have elicited preferences for PES with in-kind group payments such as
health, education and employment projects or productive assets (Balderas Torres et al.,
2013; Costedoat et al., 2016). Since these beneﬁts would accrue at the collective level,
one cannot infer which proportion is due to the in-kind payment alone.implemented as up-front payment, especially if it aims to promote envi-
ronmental friendly practices. It seems difﬁcult or impossible to with-
draw such once-off payments in case of non-compliance (Kaczan et
al., 2013). Agricultural inputs for seasonal agriculture can circumvent
many of these pitfalls. First, inputs such as seeds and fertilizer can be di-
vided into small units that would allow compensation proportional to
the individual conservation efforts. Second, such inputs are usually re-
quired every year, so that annually receiving inputs can be conditional
on the conservation outcomes in the prior year.
A better understanding of the preferences of small-scale farmers is
crucial to designing and implementing such novel incentive schemes.
Programmes based on the target group's preferences have a higher en-
rolment and likelihood of contract adherence (Petheram and Campbell,
2010). This relates not only to payment-related characteristics as
indicated above, but also to attributes such as contract length or
implementing organization. This paper sets out to answer three
research questions:
1. Do potential PES recipients prefer agricultural support through input
provisioning over cash payments?
2. How are such PES programmes best adapted to farmers' preferences
in terms of payment-unrelated characteristics?
3. Can such programmesmotivate farmers who are most likely to carry
out environmentally destructive activities to enrol in PES to ensure
environmental effectiveness?
Zambia provides a suitable showcase for this research, as it is one of
the most densely forested countries in Africa and experiences high de-
forestation rates. Small-scale agriculture is considered to be one of the
major drivers of deforestation (Vinya et al., 2011). At the same time, in-
creasing agricultural productivity of small- and medium-scale farmers,
particularly through a fertilizer subsidy programme, is a policy objective
in Zambia (Mason et al., 2013).
PES schemes require clearly deﬁned property rights over forests, ei-
ther at the individual, community or state level (Wunder, 2009). Most
PES are discussed and implemented under individual property rights
of forests. In this case, recipients receive a compensation conditional
on conserving the private forest area. In the case of common property
forests, a larger group of forest users can potentially engage in defores-
tation. For this type of property rights, group-based PES where pay-
ments are conditional on the conservation performance of the group
and not the individual are appropriate (Engel, 2016). Land in Zambia
is vested in, administered, and controlled by the president and shall
be used for the common beneﬁt of the people of Zambia (RoZ, 1995
Art. 3, 5). Similarly, ownership of trees and forest produce on any land
is vested in the president (RoZ, 1999 Art. 3). Individualized tenure on
customary land such as our project area is limited to use rights (RoZ,
1995 Art. 8). Critical is in particular the stipulation of the Forest Act
that trees may be felled and land cleared by residents of customary
areas for the purpose of agriculture (RoZ, 1999 Art. 38). The majority
of land in Zambia is under customary tenure (61%), where alsomost for-
ests are found (63%) (ZFD and FAO, 2008). In these areas, local chiefs
and headmen allocate individual land use rights to the local population.
In this tenure situation, individual contracts for forests with individ-
ual use rights or group payments for common forests alone would risk
that deforestation is simply shifted to areas that are not covered by
PES. We therefore collected individual preferences for receiving pay-
ments that compensate farmers for remaining on their current private-
ly-owned agricultural land andnot converting forests to new cultivation
areas, irrespective ofwhether the forest is located on landused privately
or communally. Such individual contracts would require however a full
enrolment rate at the community level, since non-participating farmers
could continue to clear both private and common forests. This hints at
the general challenge of PES schemes for common property forests.
There are different options for addressing these challenges ranging
from individual contracts targetingmost conservation-averse residents,
customary and/or statutory regulatory backup and group contracts.
4 A detailed theoretical derivation for the RPL model and LCM can be found in Train
(2009).
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dividual preferences ideally also inform the design of such PES.
Discussing respective institutional options is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper.
We use a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to elicit preferences for
PES contract design attributes, in particular preferences for cash vs- in-
kind payments. In addition, we include payment-unrelated attributes
such as contract length, implementing organization and forest co-bene-
ﬁts to identify which contract characteristics best motivate farmers to
enrol in PES schemes. Our DCE allows to separately analyze preferences
of farmers with andwithout intentions to clear forest in the near future.
Through this we can evaluate which PES contracts motivate farmers
who are most likely to engage in environmentally destructive activities
to enrol in PES to ensure environmental effectiveness. Our results sug-
gest that potential PES recipients in Zambia value in-kind agricultural
inputs more highly than cash payments (even when the monetary
value of the inputs is lower than the cash payment), highlighting that
PES could potentially succeed in conserving forests and intensifying
smallholder agriculture. Respondents who intended to clear forest
within the next three years were found to require higher payments,
but could be motivated to enrol in appropriately designed PES.
2. Method and Experimental Design
2.1. Stated Preferences and Discrete Choice Experiments
We compare alternative PES contract designs using Discrete Choice
Experiments (DCE). In the ﬁeld of environmental economics, stated
preference methods in general and DCE in particular have been applied
for the valuation of ecosystem services or other non-market environ-
mental goods (Carson and Czajkowski, 2014). More recently the meth-
od has also been used to reveal preferences for policy instruments such
as PES (e.g. Balderas Torres et al., 2013; Costedoat et al., 2016; Cranford
andMourato, 2014). The methodology rests on the assumption that re-
spondents' choices between hypothetical alternatives – in our case PES
contracts - reveal the order of their preferences. The hypothetical nature
of decision making in DCE however raises questions concerning the in-
centive compatibility. The so-called hypothetical bias may result from
lack of incentives for respondents to truthfully reveal their preferences.
Several techniques have been proposed to minimize this hypothetical
bias. Among them cheap talk is widely used, but its effectiveness has
been debated (see Ladenburg and Olsen (2014) for a discussion on
this topic). Despite these drawbacks, DCE offer the advantage of not re-
quiring the costly and lengthy implementation of policy programmes to
elicit revealed preferences. DCE also allow to evaluate potential combi-
nations of programme characteristics simultaneously, while deriving an
overall ‘willingness to accept’ for programme participation (Kaczan et
al., 2013).
We included in the introduction of the DCE a short reminder to care-
fully make the decisions (see Online-Appendix B). In addition, we
adopted a sequential design. First respondentswere asked to choose be-
tween two contracts and afterwards asked if they would accept it over
the status quo. Especially in the choice situations between alternative
contracts we are, however, little concerned about structural biases as
the attributes do not provoke strong social desirability. We acknowl-
edge that in the decision whether to accept the better of the two con-
tracts respondents may feel that it is expected from them to choose a
contract. But as in any other DCE, we cannot determine to what extent
a hypothetical bias is present and our ﬁndings should be consequently
interpreted with caution.”
2.2. Theory and Econometric Models
In our choice experiment, each alternative PES contract is described
by a set of attributes (see Section 2.3). We assume that respondent n
chooses between j=1,… , J contracts, that each generate a utility Unj.Weassume that respondent nmaximizes her overall utility by accepting
the contract with the relatively largest utility. Let Unj denote the overall
utility of respondent n for contract j that consists of a systematic, ob-
served utility component Vnj and an unobserved utility component εnj.
Unj ¼ Vnj þ εnj ð1Þ
The observed utility component of respondent n is assumed to be a
linear additive function of xnjk variables for k=1,… ,K attributes that
describe contract j, each weighted with a coefﬁcient βnjk:
Vnj ¼∑
K
k¼1
xnjk βnjk ð2Þ
To analyze our experimental data,we applied the randomparameter
logit (RPL) model4 as it allows for preference heterogeneity across the
sampled population to be taken into account. It assumes that the coefﬁ-
cients βjk vary over respondents (but not across choice situations) with
density f(β). This density can be characterized by parameters θ such as
mean and variance of β′s in the population. RPL allows the repeated
choices of the same respondents across different choice situations to
be accounted for (Revelt and Train, 1998).
In order to identify sample segments with shared preferences and
socio-economic characteristics, we also applied a latent class model
(LCM). Instead of assuming that β′s are continuously distributed with
parameters θ, LCMs assume a discrete distribution of β′s with a ﬁnite
set of values. As a consequence, LCMs do not require any a-priori distri-
butional assumptions for f(β). LCMs assume that the sample is segment-
ed in a given number of latent classes q, each with shared preferences
and hence speciﬁc parameter estimates βq′. Latent class membership
probabilities are estimated for each individual conditional on socio-eco-
nomic covariates.
Based on the LCMwe furthermore estimated choice probabilities for
a PES contract optimally adapted to the respondents and the status quo
with variable transfer amounts. This allows us to derive estimations for
the minimum transfer amounts needed to make respondents with for-
est clearing intentions accept PES. The detailed methodology can be
found in Online-Appendix A. Both RPL and LCM were estimated with
R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015) using the GMNL Package (Sarrias and
Daziano, 2015).
Respondentswere confrontedwith a series of choice situations. Each
choice situation consisted of two separate PES contracts that differed in
their attributes. We adapted a sequential design (Veldwijk et al., 2014).
Firstly, respondents were asked which of the two PES contracts they
preferred. Secondly, they were asked whether they would accept the
preferred contract over the status-quo without PES. See Online-Appen-
dix B for the general introduction of the choice experiment and a choice
situation example.
To reduce the number of choice situations presented to each respon-
dent we generated an efﬁcient design. Recent empirical evidence sug-
gests that efﬁcient designs gain more precise parameter estimates
than the commonly used orthogonal designs (Bliemer and Rose, 2011;
Yang et al., 2014) and perform better in terms of behavioural efﬁciency
(Yao et al., 2014). The generation of efﬁcient designs requires prior
knowledge of parameter estimates, which can sometimes be obtained
from existing studies. We conducted a pilot study to gain prior esti-
mates. The pilot survey covered 73 individuals (292 choice observa-
tions) in eight randomly selected villages, using an orthogonal design.
Based on the estimated parameters of a conditional logit model a D-Ef-
ﬁcient Design was generated with the software package Ngene. To re-
duce the cognitive burden for respondents and reduce fatigue, the 16
generated choice situations were further split into four sets with four
Table 1
Attributes, levels and hypotheses.
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to one of the sets.Attribute Levels Hypotheses
Payment vehicle Annual cash payment
(in April each year)
Monthly cash payments
Voucher payments (before
the growing season)
Input payments (delivered
before the growing season)
H1: respondents prefer on
average input and voucher
payments over annual and
monthly cash payments.
H2: respondents prefer on
average input over voucher
payments.
Payment levelsa
(Zambian Kwacha
per year per acre)
60 (8.2US$)
120 (16.4US$)
240 (32.9US$)
480 (65.8US$)
Contract duration 10 years
20 years
Implementing
organization
Government of Zambia
NGO
Forest co-beneﬁts No extraction
Firewood extraction
Subsistence extraction
Commercial extraction
H3: respondents have on
average a preference for
less restrictive forest
co-beneﬁts over more
restrictive levels.
a Based on average exchange rate in June 2014 (1 USD = 7.3 ZMW).2.3. Attributes & Hypothesis
To answer the ﬁrst research question, i.e. the potential scope of
providing agricultural inputs instead of cash payments at reduced pro-
gramme costs, the deﬁning attribute of the choice experiment speciﬁes
how the payments aremade. Including realistic payment vehicles in the
choice sets, required us to combine several speciﬁc characteristicswith-
in the payment attribute. Cash payments on one hand can be done
monthly or annual. In this case, they are designed to compensate
farmers for the additional income they could derive from newly cleared
agricultural areas, around the harvest season starting from April. Agri-
cultural inputs are, in contrast, required before the growing season in
November/December each year. In a similar manner, in-kind payments
can be either inputs that are delivered to each village or vouchers that
can only be redeemed in shops that are based in the district capital. In-
cluding several distinct payment attributes such as timing, location and
payment type would have led to unrealistic combinations (such as
monthly payments in agricultural inputs). We therefore opted to in-
clude four credible combinations of timing, location and type of pay-
ment within one attribute. This has however the disadvantage that we
cannot clearly identify whether and to what extent particular aspects
of a payment vehicle inﬂuenced itsﬁnal valuation.We included two dif-
ferent levels of in-kind paymentswith variation in the delivery plus two
kinds of cash payment: (a) annual cash payments in April each year;
(b) monthly cash payments; (c) in-kind payment with agricultural in-
puts (seeds, fertilizer and pesticides) delivered to the village5 at the
beginning of each growing season (hereafter referred to as input pay-
ments); (d) in-kind payment with agricultural inputs (see above) as a
voucher that can be redeemed in the district capital at the beginning
of each growing season (hereafter referred to as voucher payment).
Kaczan et al. (2013) conducted a choice experiment on PES in Tanza-
nia and found a strong preference for a one-off upfront in-kind fertilizer
payment over individual or collective cash payments. We therefore
expect input and voucher payments to be preferred to cash payments
(Hypothesis 1).While input payments include the delivery of the inputs
to the village and voucher payment implies that transport must be cov-
ered by recipients,we expect input payments to be preferred to voucher
payments (Hypothesis 2).
PES commonly aim at compensating for the opportunity costs of
conservation (Engel, 2016). The main economic beneﬁts of forest clear-
ing in the research area accrue due to the shifting of agriculture fromold
ﬁelds to newly cleared areas with higher soil fertility. Initial levels for
the payment amounts were therefore estimated by reviewing literature
on the opportunity costs of agricultural land uses, in particular maize
yields in Zambia (Xu et al., 2009). Further adaptation throughout the
pre-test and pilot led to a ﬁnal range of 8.2–65.8 US$ per year per
acre. With the maximum amount it is possible to cover the entire
input costs for maize cultivation (optimal quantity of fertilizer as sug-
gested by Xu et al. (2009) and hybrid seeds). The corresponding values
for monthly cash payments were included, if the payment vehicle was
monthly cash payments.6
Regarding our second and third researchquestions,we included four
attributes besides payment vehicle in the design (see Table 1). Knowl-
edge about recipients' preferences regarding these attributes allows
adapting PES designs to reduce transfers amounts, to assure high enrol-
ment rates and effectiveness in terms of environmental outcomes.5 It was speciﬁed that the inputs are delivered to the village, but not whether to the
households directly or to a central point in each village. We belief that this distinction
would however only result in small changes in the valuation. Villages are relatively small
and due to small ﬁeld sizes the actual amount of fertilizer per household would be small.
6 In the payment amount description for input and voucher payments, we speciﬁed the
amount with respect to fertilizer (see Online-Appendix B).Several choice experiments included the contract duration as an at-
tribute in their experimental design. Overall empirical evidence is in-
conclusive. Some studies found a preference for shorter contracts (5 vs
9 vs 17 years) (Balderas Torres et al., 2013), while others found prefer-
ences for longer contracts (15 vs 25 vs 35 years) (Ariﬁn et al., 2009) and
(3 vs 10 years) (Zabel and Engel, 2010). In the latter cases, however, the
provision of the environmental service required large investments that
are only likely to pay-off after long periods. In the research area, clearing
is for most households an irregular activity. Roughly half of the respon-
dents (49%) have cleared in the last 5 years. The majority of these
households (73%) has cleared in this period only once. Only 6% has
cleared every year within this period. Short contract periods would
therefore risk that households simply clear forest after a PES contract
expires. We therefore speciﬁed a minimum contract duration of
10 years and included a second level of 20 years.
In the context of REDD+, it has been demonstrated that PES
schemes can be implemented by governments directly or through
other organizations under a multi-level REDD+ scheme (Wertz-
Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009). Empirical studies from Zambia sug-
gest that trust in the government, particularly at the local level, is low.
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) leaders are, however, consid-
ered to be less corrupt (Mulenga et al., 2004). Therefore, we gave two
options for implementing organization: the Government of Zambia
and a generic NGO. To our knowledge, none of the reviewed choice
experiments on PES in developing countries varied the implementing
organization in their design.
Various timber andnon-timber forest products play a signiﬁcant role
in the livelihoods of rural communities in Zambia and provide common
coping strategies in times of idiosyncratic shocks (Kalaba et al., 2013).
We included four levels of forest co-beneﬁts that each specify what
kind of forest products can be extracted and for what use: (a) no extrac-
tion of any type of forest product; (b) only the collection of dead ﬁre-
wood is allowed for home consumption; (c) collection of any timber
and non-timber forest product is allowed for home consumption;
(d) collection of any timber and non-timber forest product is allowed
for home consumption and commercial use. The last corresponds with
the current level of forest use restrictions. Evidence from Vietnam sug-
gests that potential PES recipients want to keep their rights to collect
forest products (Petheram and Campbell, 2010). Due to the overall im-
portance of forest products for rural livelihoods in Zambia, we therefore
expect respondents to show a clear preference for weaker forest use re-
strictions (Hypothesis 3).
99T. Vorlaufer et al. / Ecological Economics 141 (2017) 95–105An Alternative Speciﬁc Constant (ASC) is included in the economet-
ric model to capture the overall utility derived from the status quo
(Hensher et al., 2015, pp. 53–54). The co-beneﬁts attribute is included
in effects coding,7 since the commercial and subsistence extraction of
forest products is allowed in the status quo. The remaining attributes
cannot be deﬁned for the status quo, as they apply only to situations
with a PES contract. In this case a hybrid coding is preferred (Cooper
et al., 2012). The payment amount variable is treated as quasi-
continuous and deﬁned as 0 US$ for the status quo. The ﬁnal observed
component of the utility models for Contracts A, B and the status quo
can hence be summarized as follows:
VA=B ¼ β0 annual:cashA=B þ β1 monthly:cashA=B
þ β2 inputA=Bþβ3 voucherA=B þ β4 amountA=B
þ β5 durationA=B þ β6 no:benefitsA=B þ β7 firewoodA=B
þ β8 subsistence:benefitsA=B þ β9 commercial:benefitsA=B
þ β10 organizationA=B ð3Þ
VSQ ¼ βSQ þ β9 commercial  benefitsSQ ð4Þ
3. Study Context and Sample
The study is based on a sample of 320 smallholder farmers located in
Mumbwa District in the Central Province of Zambia, roughly 160 km
from the nation's capital (see Fig. 1). The research area is part of a ded-
icated buffer zone of the Kafue National Park, theMumbwa GameMan-
agement Area. The area was selected due to its diversity in forest-
agriculture landscapes and accelerating forest clearing. While the re-
search site still hosts signiﬁcant areas of forest, agriculture especially
through smallholders continually reduces forested areas. Between
2010 and 2014, 49% of our sampled households cleared forest. Of the re-
spondents, 42% indicated that they intended to clear additional forest in
the next three years. These deforestation dynamics cannot be consid-
ered sustainable: between 2010 and 2014 the area of agricultural land
of our sample increased by 32%.
Within Mumbwa District we selected the Chibuluma and
Kabulwebulwe chiefdoms in the western part of the district. They com-
prise 45 and 73 villages respectively and accommodate roughly 1400
households each. Lists of all villages in both chiefdoms were compiled
and 22 villages were selected randomly.8 Based on household lists
obtained from traditional authorities, 18 households were randomly
selected per village and the respective household heads were invited
to participate. In cases where the household head was ill or absent,
the acting household head was interviewed. This applied to 17% of
respondents.
Qualitative, exploratory researchwas conducted betweenApril 2014
and May 2015 in Zambia. The choice experiments and a corresponding
household survey were conducted between May and September 2015.
We tested the experimental design with an initial pre-test with twelve
respondents to review attribute levels, explanation of choice tasks and
contracts. To assure that respondents have understood the experiment
and managed to compare the two different contracts, each choice ex-
periment was individually administered by a research assistant. The at-
tributes of each contract were explained in-depth and respondents7 When an ASC is used for the status quo, dummy coding would result in confounding
the ASC with the base category effect of the dummy coded variable. In this case, effects
coding is preferred over dummy coding as it speciﬁes the estimates of the effect codes rel-
ative to the average effect of the variable and not relative to a speciﬁedbase category (Bech
and Gyrd-Hansen, 2005).
8 Two randomly selected villages could not be covered by the study. In one case the
headmandenied permission to conduct research,while the headman position in the other
village was vacant and recruiting of respondents proved difﬁcult. In other villages, a few
invited households could not participate due to absence or illness. Two respondents re-
fused to participate in the choice experiment andwere excluded from the dataset. Towhat
extent this affects the representativeness of our sample cannot be determined.could ask questions at any point of the experiment. Difﬁculties in choos-
ing can result in delayed responses, fatigue and boredom. We have nei-
ther experienced those signs during the pre-test nor during the actual
survey. Key socio-economic characteristics and variables used in the
LCM are summarized in Table 2.
Maize constitutes the most important crop in the sample occupying
approximately 60% of the cultivation area in 2013/14 and 300 out of 320
households cultivated the crop. On average households from the sample
achieve maize yields of 1.5 t/ha. Similar yields are found by more com-
prehensive studies in the same agro-ecological region of Zambia (Xu et
al., 2009). Fertilizer is predominantly applied for maize cultivation.
Overall, 192 households (60%) have applied fertilizer for maize in the
season 2013/14, while only 11 households (3%) applied fertilizer to
other crops, mainly vegetables. Out of the 125 households that have
not applied any fertilizer, 90% state that cash constraints were the
main reason for not using any fertilizer. On average 120 kg/ha of fertil-
izer was applied to maize, which is signiﬁcantly lower than the ofﬁcial
recommendation by extension services of 400 kg/ha (Xu et al., 2009).
Recent studies however indicate that ofﬁcial recommendations for
fertilizer quantities promoted by extension services are often not eco-
nomically viable for farmers (e.g. Duﬂo et al., 2008).While the economic
proﬁtability of fertilizer application depends on a number ofmoderating
variables such asmaize-fertilizer price ratio, timely application and seed
varieties, Xu et al. (2009) ﬁnd that between one third and two third of
the recommended nitrogen quantity is economically viable for small-
holder farmers in the same agro-ecological region in Zambia, if provided
on time. In our sample, 41% and 81% of fertilizer users have applied in
2013/14 below one and two third of the ofﬁcial recommendations re-
spectively. Increasing the application of fertilizer, especially if combined
with the adoption of hybrid seeds, would consequently allow most
smallholder farmers in our sample to increase maize yields.
4. Results
4.1. Random Parameter Logit Model
We report models of the combined dataset with (a) the choices be-
tween two hypothetical contracts and (b) the choice to accept or reject
the preferred contract.9 The dataset comprises two questions per choice
set, so with 320 individuals and four choice sets each a total of 2560
choice observations were obtained. The RPL model includes four ran-
domparameters for attributes that are found to be heterogeneously dis-
tributed, indicated by signiﬁcant standard deviations of parameters at
the 0.01 level (Table 3). All random parameters were speciﬁed as nor-
mally distributed.
The results of the RPLmodel indicate that input payments are signif-
icantly preferred over any other payment vehicle (ﬁrst column Table 3).
The least preferred vehicle is monthly cash payment, followed by annu-
al cash payments. Even though voucher payment is the second most
preferred level, the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant from the grand
mean of all payment vehicle levels. We observe a signiﬁcant heteroge-
neity regarding the valuation of input payments in the sample, indicated
by a signiﬁcant standard deviation of the random parameter. Neverthe-
less, small fractions of respondents favour alternative payment vehicles.
Only 4.9%, 0.78% and 0.13% of respondents prefer voucher, annual and
monthly cash payments, respectively, over input payments. Overall,
we can conﬁrm Hypothesis 1 that respondents prefer on average
input and voucher payments over annual and monthly cash payments.
Furthermore, we can conﬁrm Hypothesis 2 that respondents prefer on
average input over voucher payments.
The RPL model results allow the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween speciﬁc attributes of interests to be calculated (Hensher et al.,
2015, p. 378). Speciﬁcally, we are interested in howmuch the payment9 Models with the choice between the two hypothetical contracts only are presented in
Online-Appendix D.
Fig. 1. Geographical location of the research area.
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of utility, if respondents were paid with vouchers or inputs instead of
annual cash transfers. On average, respondents would require 79.1
and 25 US$ per year per acre less if they received agricultural inputs
or vouchers, respectively, instead of cash.
The status quo parameter is negative, implying that on average re-
spondents prefer the contractual limitations of the PES contract to the
status quo. The random parameter distribution indicates that 18.5%
have a positive parameter estimate for the status quo and hence
would require additional incentives to accept the proposed contracts.
Higher payments are preferred over smaller ones. The four
levels of forest co-beneﬁts show a signiﬁcant impact on the
respondents' choices. A full prohibition of any forest use is the least
preferred attribute level, followed by ﬁrewood beneﬁts only. In
contrast to Hypothesis 3, the level that permits extraction of
forest products for subsistence use is preferred over contracts
that allow collection of forest products for commercial purposes. ThisTable 2
Socio-economic characteristics of sample.
Statistic
Age (years)
Female respondents
Education (years of schooling)a
Respondents who migrated in last ﬁve years
Risk aversion scoreb (1–3 risk loving, 4 risk neutral, 5–6 risk averse, 7–8 highly risk averse
Total Field Size (cultivated and fallows in hectare)
Cultivation area 2014/15 as percent of total ﬁeld size
Total cash income (2014/15) in US$c
Crop production share among total cash income (2014/15)
Years of fertilizer use (2010–2014)
Number of years when forest was cleared (2010–2014)
Respondents with clearing intention (2015–2017)
a Education above higher secondary school is coded as 13 years.
b Elicited through a risk experiment (see Online-Appendix C).
c 1 US$ = 7.3 ZMW.
d The remaining respondents could not provide this information.difference in effects is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (one sample, right-
tailed z-test: H1:subsistence·beneﬁtsNcommercial·beneﬁts , z=
1.921 , p−value=0.027). On average, respondents would accept
9.8 US$ per acre per year less if commercial extraction of forest products
was not allowed, whilemaintaining their right to collect forest products
for their subsistence. In addition, our sample tends to prefer an NGO to
the government as the implementing organization. This effect is small in
magnitude but statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Contract dura-
tion is the only attribute that shows no signiﬁcant effect on respondents'
contract choices.
In addition, we further split the sample between respondents with
and without self-stated intention to convert forests to agricultural
land in the next three years. The respective regression results are
shown in the second and third column of Table 3. Overall, valuations
of the individual attributes are similar between both sub-samples.
Both groups prefer input over voucher and cash payments. The only no-
ticeable difference is in the status quo valuation. Respondents withN (%) Mean St. Dev. Min- Max
320 44.74 15.70 19–87
103 (32%)
320 6.38 3.17 0–13
54 (17%)
) 320 6.62 2.26 1–8
320 6.88 10.26 0.40–80.94
320 63.03 29.22 0–100
319d 706.60 1559.40 0–18,190
307d 44.63 39.80 0–100
320 2.61 2.09 0–5
320 0.75 1.10 0–5
134 (42%)
Table 3
Results of the random parameter logit models.
Full dataset Future clearing No future
clearing
Status quo −2.45 (0.28)⁎⁎⁎ −1.57 (0.38)⁎⁎⁎ −3.14 (0.43)⁎⁎⁎
Annual cash paymentb −0.42 −0.51 −0.35
Monthly cash payment −0.80 (0.11)⁎⁎⁎ −0.73 (0.17)⁎⁎⁎ −0.88 (0.14)⁎⁎⁎
Voucher payment 0.08 (0.08) 0.25 (0.13)⁎⁎ −0.06 (0.11)
Input payment 1.14 (0.16)⁎⁎⁎ 0.99 (0.24)⁎⁎⁎ 1.29 (0.22)⁎⁎⁎
No forest beneﬁts −1.97 (0.18)⁎⁎⁎ −1.88 (0.28)⁎⁎⁎ −2.09 (0.25)⁎⁎⁎
Firewood beneﬁts −0.23 (0.09)⁎⁎⁎ −0.54 (0.15)⁎⁎⁎ −0.04 (0.11)
Subsistence forest beneﬁts 1.20 (0.10)⁎⁎⁎ 1.42 (0.17)⁎⁎⁎ 1.07 (0.13)⁎⁎⁎
Commercial forest beneﬁtsb 1.00 1.00 1.06
Amount 0.02 (0.00)⁎⁎⁎ 0.02 (0.00)⁎⁎⁎ 0.02 (0.00)⁎⁎⁎
Contract duration −0.04 (0.06) 0.03 (0.09) −0.08 (0.08)
Organization 0.12 (0.04)⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 (0.07) 0.20 (0.06)⁎⁎⁎
Standard deviationa
Status quo 2.73 (0.29)⁎⁎⁎ 2.72 (0.42)⁎⁎⁎ 2.77 (0.42)⁎⁎⁎
Input payment 0.64 (0.15)⁎⁎⁎ 0.71 (0.22)⁎⁎⁎ 0.64 (0.22)⁎⁎⁎
No forest beneﬁts 0.81 (0.13)⁎⁎⁎ 0.96 (0.25)⁎⁎⁎ 0.75 (0.17)⁎⁎⁎
Firewood beneﬁts 0.54 (0.12)⁎⁎⁎ 0.59 (0.21)⁎⁎⁎ 0.55 (0.16)⁎⁎⁎
AIC 2445.89 1108.48 1328.36
Log likelihood −1208.95 −540.24 −650.18
Num. obs. 2560.00 1088.00 1472.00
Standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
a All random parameter estimates are based on 1000 Halton Draws. The random param-
eters are assumed to be normally distributed.
b The parameter of the effects-coded base category is calculated as the negative sum of
the other level estimates (Cooper et al., 2012).
Table 4
Latent class model parameter estimates.
Class 1 2 3
Status quo 2.45 (0.41)⁎⁎⁎ −2.68 (0.23)⁎⁎⁎ −0.57 (0.45)
Annual cash paymenta −0.90 −0.38 0.15
Monthly cash payment −1.10 (0.33)⁎⁎⁎ −0.86 (0.13)⁎⁎⁎ 0.43 (0.41)
Voucher payment 0.32 (0.24) 0.14 (0.09)⁎ −0.46 (0.41)
Input payment 1.68 (0.39)⁎⁎⁎ 1.10 (0.18)⁎⁎⁎ −0.12 (0.47)
No forest beneﬁts −0.40 (0.44) −1.82 (0.20)⁎⁎⁎ −3.14 (1.02)⁎⁎⁎
Firewood beneﬁts −0.48 (0.24)⁎⁎ 0.17 (0.09)⁎ −1.84 (0.35)⁎⁎⁎
Subsistence forest beneﬁts 0.26 (0.24) 1.06 (0.11)⁎⁎⁎ 1.96 (0.69)⁎⁎⁎
Commercial forest beneﬁtsa 0.62 0.59 3.02
Amount 0.01 (0.00)⁎⁎ 0.01 (0.00)⁎⁎⁎ 0.06 (0.01)⁎⁎⁎
Contract duration −0.02 (0.15) −0.15 (0.07)⁎⁎ 0.55 (0.33)⁎
Organization −0.12 (0.11) 0.10 (0.04)⁎⁎ 0.09 (0.24)
Class membership
Intercept 1.00 (0.32)⁎⁎⁎ 1.41 (0.37)⁎⁎⁎
Age 0.02 (0.00)⁎⁎⁎ −0.00 (0.01)
Gender (female) −0.33 (0.16)⁎⁎ 0.05 (0.19)
Migrated (last ﬁve years) −1.07 (0.19)⁎⁎⁎ −0.86 (0.22)⁎⁎⁎
Risk aversion 0.13 (0.03)⁎⁎⁎ −0.05 (0.03)⁎
Years of fertilizer use
(last ﬁve years)
−0.23 (0.04)⁎⁎⁎ −0.16 (0.04)⁎⁎⁎
Years of clearing
(last ﬁve years)
0.68 (0.16)⁎⁎⁎ 1.46 (0.18)⁎⁎⁎
Planned clearing −0.53 (0.14)⁎⁎⁎ −0.78 (0.17)⁎⁎⁎
Average class membership
probability
11.51 64.31 24.18
AIC 2317.47
Log likelihood −1112.73
Num. obs. 2504.00
Standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
a The parameter of the effects-coded base category is calculated as the negative sum of
the other level estimates (Cooper et al., 2012).
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dents with intention to clear have a positive status quo valuation com-
pared to only 13% of the respondents without clearing intention.
4.2. Latent Class Logit Model
In order to further explore the heterogeneous preferences for con-
tract attributes and how they are related to socio-economic covariates,
we present a LCM. This also allows us to identify whether preferences
for those householdsmost likely to clear forest are systematically differ-
ent. We determined three classes as appropriate due to relatively good
performance across different information criteria.10 Table 4 summarizes
the parameter estimates for each class and respective classmembership
predictions based on socio-economic covariates.
With respect to payment vehiclewe ﬁnd that Class 3 does not choose
their contract depending on howpayments aremade. No payment vehi-
cle coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant. However, this class is most sensitive to pay-
ment levels. In contrast, Classes 1 and 2 show similar preferences for
input over voucher payments and monthly and annual cash payments
are the least preferred payment vehicle. Both classes seem to dominate
the average preferences found in the RPLmodel. Access to fertilizer does
not consistently predict preferences for input payments. Even though
Classes 2 and 3 have different preferences for input payment, respon-
dents of both classes applied fertilizer less frequently in the last ﬁve
years than Class 1, as indicated by negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
Socio-economic covariates show that past and future clearing behav-
iour signiﬁcantly affects class membership probabilities. Respondents
who cleared less frequently in the past ﬁve years and have plans to
clear in thenext three years aremore likely to belong to Class 1. The larg-
est Class 2 (64%) has a negative appraisal for the status quo, whereas the
small Class 1 (12%)would require additional incentives to enter the con-
tract, indicated by a positive and signiﬁcant status quo coefﬁcient.10 The Akaike's Information Criterion, the modiﬁed Akaike's Information Criterion with
penalty factor three and the Bayesian Information Criteria (see Online-Appendix F for
more information).4.3. Estimated Choice Probabilities and Sensitivity to Payment Amount
Next, we illustrate towhat extent the different latent classes are sen-
sitive to changes in payment levels. The LCMmodel is used to estimate
choices between the status quo and the PES contract most preferable to
the sample respondents. Furthermore, we estimate the share of respon-
dents with clearing intentions who are likely to accept PES contracts at
varying payment levels. The RPL suggests that, on average, the most
preferred contracts feature input payments, subsistence forest beneﬁts,
a 10-year contract duration and an NGO as implementing organization.
Even though the optimal PES contract was designed according to the
RPL results, the design does not strongly oppose the preferences of
any class from the LCM. Individual choice probabilities were estimated
for the overall LCM, conditional on class membership probabilities
(see Online-Appendix A). Respondents with a choice probability N0.8
for the PES contract are classiﬁed as accepting the PES contract, whereas
those with choice probabilities N0.8 for the status quo are classiﬁed as
refusing the contract. The results are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Overall, we observe a major increase in respondents accepting the
PES contract from 60% to almost 90% with payments doubling from 20
to 40 US$ per year per acre. Changes in payments below and beyond
this range show only minor effects on choice probabilities. At the
same time, we observe substantial differences for the acceptance prob-
abilities between classes. Class 2with a negative status quo coefﬁcient is
highly likely to accept the PES contract, irrespective of payment levels.
Increases in payments have, however, a substantial positive effect on
choice probability for Classes 1 and 3. Overall, choice probability for
Class 3 is higher than for Class 1 and signiﬁcantly increases from
below 30% to roughly 80% within the payment range of 0–40 US$ per
year per acre. Class 1members are less sensitive to changes in payments
levels. Class 1 is, however, critical for a PES scheme to provide additional
environmental beneﬁts. Respondents with future clearing plans are
Fig. 2. Estimated choices and choice probabilities by latent classes for optimal PES contracts relative to payment levels.
102 T. Vorlaufer et al. / Ecological Economics 141 (2017) 95–105more likely to belong to this segment. Thus, we separately estimated
contract choice probabilities based on LCMs (see Online-Appendix E)
for respondents with and without the intention to clear forest within
thenext three years (see Fig. 3). For respondentswithout clearing inten-
tion, contract acceptance is strongly increasing within the range of 0 to
10 US$ per year per acre to N90%. A relatively small share of b10% are
likely to decline the PES contract irrespective of the payment amount.
Respondents with plans to clear show an overall lower contract accep-
tance probability, with higher shares of indecisive respondents. But
with payments rising from 20 to 40 US$ per year per acre, contract ac-
ceptance substantially increases from below 40% to N80%. While no re-
spondents with clearing plans would refuse the contract, a share of
almost 20% remains indecisive irrespective of the payment amount.
5. Discussion
5.1. Preferences for Cash Versus In-kind Payments
Our ﬁrst research question was to evaluate to what extent respon-
dents prefer in-kind agricultural support to cash payments. Potentially,
proﬁts from intensiﬁed agriculture allow respondents to achieve higher
monetary beneﬁts than solely fromcash transfers. Similarly to Kaczan etFig. 3. Estimated choices for optimal PES contracts relative to payment levels ofal. (2013), who deﬁned in-kind payments as one-off payments at the
beginning of the contract, we ﬁnd that payments as agricultural inputs
(including fertilizer) are preferred to cash payments of the same value
and with the same frequency (annual). Our results also suggest that
voucher payments are preferred to cash payments. While preferences
for input payments could be explained with signiﬁcant transaction
costs that occur when acquiring fertilizer with received cash payments,
the preferences for vouchers over cash payments are less intuitive. We
offer two potential explanations for these results.
Duﬂo et al. (2011) show both theoretically and empirically that
present-biased farmers procrastinate over fertilizer purchase due to de-
cision and transactions costs and alternative investment opportunities
prior to the next growing season. Such farmers eventually fail to pur-
chase fertilizer. If our respondents are however aware of such time-
inconsistent behaviour, they could preventively prefer vouchers to
cash payments. A second possible explanation for the preferences for
voucher over cash payments is based on the capabilities to save cash
payments. This is especially valid since the cash payments were de-
signed to be paid out in April each year, around harvest time and
months before fertilizers are commonly purchased. Lack of access to ﬁ-
nancial services and social obligations to share cash income with larger
family networks potentially limit capabilities for saving cash over longerrespondents with and without clearing intentions in the next three years.
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ment device for farmers to assure that inputs are acquired before the
next growing season (cf Bryan et al., 2010).
Even though both models ﬁnd heterogeneity for the valuation of in-
kind payments, adoption of such payment vehicles would not compro-
mise contract attractiveness among sample segments. The LCM reveals
that one fourth of the respondents are ambivalent regarding the pay-
ment vehicle, while the remaining respondents clearly prefer input
and voucher payments. Interestingly, the LCM indicates that past fertil-
izer use cannot explain preference heterogeneity for input payments.
Fertilizer adoption in our sample is relatively low and many farmers
applying fertilizer often do not manage to acquire optimal quantities
(see Section 3). Both the adoption of improved seeds and optimal fertil-
izer quantities would hence signiﬁcantly increase agricultural produc-
tivity for the vast majority of the sampled farmers. Overall, these
results underline that PES schemes paying in-kind with inputs or
vouchers could achieve secondary developmental objectives of agricul-
tural intensiﬁcation.
From a policy design perspective, the preferences for input and
voucher payments also indicate that certain payment vehicles can re-
duce the costs of PES. Respondents are willing to accept smaller transfer
amounts under input or voucher payments, other attributes being
equal. Considering that voucher and cash payments most likely imply
transaction costs of similarmagnitude, vouchers provide a viable option
to reduce overall programme costs. Whether vouchers or input that is
delivered to the villages are preferred in terms of cost-efﬁciency de-
pends on the relative transaction costs for both vehicles. If input pay-
ments imply transaction costs above 54.1 US$ per year per acre
compared to voucher payments, the latter payment vehicle is preferred.
5.2. Environmental Effectiveness of PES
To deliver effective positive environmental outcomes, PES schemes
need to reach all segments of the population and, most importantly,
thosewhich aremost likely to carry out environmentally destructive ac-
tivities. Our models indicate that a large share of respondents would
agree to PES contracts which contractually bind them not to clear any
forest for agriculture, even without any additional payments. Kaczan
et al. (2013) found similar results for a large segment of their sample.
They explain differences in the status quo valuationwith heterogeneous
attitudes towards environmental policy interventions and different op-
portunity costs for agroforestry. In our case, preferences to save land for
future generations or preferences for securing land-use rights for both
their current agricultural land and forests are a potential explanation
for the negative status quo valuation of the majority. Households with
plans to clear forest within the next three years are more likely to re-
quire additional incentives to enrol in PES schemes, potentially due to
higher opportunity costs of avoiding forest clearing.
Our initial hypothesis concerning forest co-beneﬁts stated that
lower restrictions of forest use are preferred to more restrictive ones.
In contrast, the analyses found that restrictions of commercial forest
use are preferred over the status quo, which allows to collect forest
products both for subsistence and commercial purposes. Based on
qualitative follow-up questions after the choice experiments, we ex-
plain this preference by concerns for excessive commercial extraction
(mainly charcoal production). Only few households derive signiﬁcant
cash income from commercial extraction of forest products. Many re-
spondents stated that a regulation of commercial extractionwould con-
serve forests for subsistence use. This indicates that respondents'
choices, at least partly, reﬂect which contract they want the overall
community to accept. These ﬁndings also suggest that restrictions of
the commercial use of forests can provide additional incentives for
most respondents to enrol in such a PES scheme.
All three models highlight that respondents have positive prefer-
ences for the amount of incentive payments, which is also in line with
former studies (Balderas Torres et al., 2013; Costedoat et al., 2016;Kaczan et al., 2013). Furthermore, most respondents with clearing
plans can be motivated to participate in the PES scheme, if payment
levels are sufﬁcient. The estimated choice probabilities for an optimal
PES design suggest that around40US$ per year per acre, contract accep-
tance increases substantially. Through separate models for households
with and without clearing plans, we found that within the range of
20–40 US$ enrolment rates of households with clearing intention in-
crease sharply up to 80%. DCE that capture preference heterogeneity
can consequently help design PES schemes and set payment levels to
ensure that critical segments of a population enrol and a positive envi-
ronmental outcome is realized.
To be effective in achieving the desired forest conservation, the PES
scheme we designed requires a full acceptance rate at the community
level. Nevertheless, our results show that approximately 10% of the re-
spondents are reluctant to accept an optimal contract design with pay-
ments between 40 and 100 US$ per year per acre. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that roughly 20% of respondentswith clearing intentions remain indeci-
sive regarding PES contracts that pay 40 US$ per year per acre. An effec-
tive scheme under a common property regime requires full enrolment
rates. Our discrete choice experiment was solely designed as individual
decision making. Consequently, it remains open whether reluctant re-
spondents would alter their decision if the majority of a community
joined a PES scheme. Potentially, further unidentiﬁed contract features
could convince this small share of the population to join the scheme.
Despite different valuations for the status quo among respondents
with andwithout clearing intentions, we do not ﬁnd preference hetero-
geneity for the remaining contract attributes. Different preferences for
these attributes would allow to offer speciﬁcally tailored contracts. Ide-
ally, respondentswithout clearing intentionswould then self-select into
contracts with preferred characteristics and lower payment amounts.
This would allow to cost-efﬁciently ensure full enrolment rates at the
community level. Even though this does not apply to our sample, stated
preferences methods, in particular DCE, allow to identify whether het-
erogeneous preferences allow for such self-selection mechanism.
The long-term environmental impact of any PES schemes ultimately
depends on thequestion howhouseholds react to the termination of the
incentives. Conventional PES provide additional monetary income for
the time of PES contracts, which could be either used directly for con-
sumption or invested in productive activities such as agriculture. In con-
trast, agricultural inputs are directly providing means to increase
productivity from agriculture. With a termination of such PES, house-
holds are likely to have realized higher yields from agriculture and are
confronted with higher incentives to increase their production by clear-
ing additional forests (Phelps et al., 2013). As a result, renewing con-
tracts under the input-based PES may require higher payments than
under a conventional PES (if monetary transfers are predominantly
used for consumption and not invested in agriculture). This could even-
tually compromise the relative cost advantage of the proposed PES
schemes compared to conventional PES.
6. Conclusion
Our results indicate that there is a potential to harness synergetic in-
teractions between PES for forest conservation and agricultural intensi-
ﬁcation. At our study site, most farmers expressed willingness to refrain
from forest clearing if compensated through PES. Respondents show
preferences for agricultural inputs or vouchers over cash transfers.
Such PES schemes may also be more cost efﬁcient, if additional transac-
tion costs of agricultural input provisioning do not exceed the reduced
transfer amounts that are possible compared to cash payments. We
used fertilizer as an example as it is a technology which is well known
in the study region. Further research could explore to what extent in-
puts related to more innovative and sustainable intensiﬁcation strate-
gies would be appreciated. This is especially important in areas, where
such PES schemes may foster excessive fertilizer application, that in
turn has adverse environmental impacts such as water pollution.
104 T. Vorlaufer et al. / Ecological Economics 141 (2017) 95–105Moreover, we ﬁnd that contract duration, implementing organization
and permitted use of forests affect the valuation of PES contracts.
To effectively reduce deforestation, PES should speciﬁcally target
households which are most likely to clear forest in future. Our results
conﬁrm that they demand higher payments than farmers who express
no strong intention to extend their ﬁelds. Nevertheless, the vast major-
ity of such respondents can be motivated to enrol for PES at reasonable
payment levels. Themethodology presentedhere provides themeans to
identify such critical segments of a PES target population and elicit their
design preferences.
This hints at the challenge facing any PES scheme in an area with
customary tenure but individualized land-use rights in ensuring full in-
dividual enrolment in the PES scheme.Without this, the environmental
outcomeof schemes is at high risk. Large forest areas could be cleared by
only a fewnon-participating famers. In such cases, individual PESwould
have to be embedded in a polycentric multi-layer forest governance
framework. Potential options include for example group contracts or
customary laws that complement individual PES contracts. In the latter
case, customary institutions could enforce and sanction land-use re-
strictions, if supported by a majority of the community. It remains for
future research to investigate how and which alternative governance
approaches best harness the individual preferences for PES contracts
presented in this paper.Funding
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